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Abstract. In models where privately informed agents interact, agents may
need to form higher order expectations, i.e. expectations of other agents’
expectations. This paper explores dynamic higher order expectations in a set-
ting where it is common knowledge that agents are rational Bayesians. This
structure allows any order of expectation at any horizon to be determined re-
cursively. The usefulness of the approach is illustrated by solving a version of
Singleton’s (1987) asset pricing model with disparately informed traders but
without assuming that shocks can be observed perfectly with a lag. In this
context, we prove that both the impact of expectations on the asset’s price
and the variance of expectations are decreasing as the order of expectation
increases. We use these results to derive a ﬁnite dimensional state representa-
tion that can be made arbitrarily accurate. The solution method exploits the
Euler-type structure of the asset pricing function and should be applicable to
a variety of settings where privately informed agents optimize intertemporally.
Keywords: Dynamic Higher Order Expectations, Private Information,
Asset Pricing
1. Introduction
Most economic models involve some type of interaction between multiple agents
where the payoﬀ of one agent depends not only on the actions taken by him, but also
on the actions taken by other agents. When agents’ preferences and environment
are identical and all share the same information, an individual agent can infer the
actions that others will take by introspection, since all agents will choose the same
action in equilibrium. If agents have access to diﬀerent information, this is no longer
possible since individual agents cannot know with certainty what other agents know
and therefore also not know with certainty what actions they will take. It then
becomes necessary for agents to form expectations about the actions of others.
Additionally, to predict the behavior of agents that form expectations about the
actions of others, one need to form expectations about other agents’ expectations
about the actions of others, and so on, leading to the well-known inﬁnite regress of
expectations.
1 The idea that agents observe diﬀerent pieces of information has a lot
of appeal and has been applied to a variety of settings, including general equilibrium
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models of the business cycle and asset pricing models.
2 However, as a consequence of
the inﬁnite regress problem one could characterize most existing models of private
information and strategic interaction as eﬀorts to avoid modelling higher order
expectations explicitly, and instead ﬁnd alternative representations where higher
order expectations do not occur as state variables. Notable exceptions are Woodford
(2002), Morris and Shin (2002) and Adam (forthcoming) who by restricting their
attention to models of static decisions are able to analyze higher order expectations
explicitly. This paper explores the properties of higher order expectations in a
setting where agents make dynamic choices and shows how such models can be
solved in a linear setting with an explicit role for higher order expectations.
Throughout this paper, it is assumed that agents are rational Bayesians and
that this is common knowledge. ‘Rational’ means that agents do not make system-
atic mistakes given their information sets. ‘Bayesian’ means that agents update
their expectations when new information arrives. That this is common knowledge
means that all agents know that all agents know, and so on, that all agents are
rational Bayesians. Common knowledge of rationality gives enough structure to
expectations to allow any order of expectation at any horizon to be determined
recursively.
3
We also use the structure imposed on expectations by common knowledge of
rationality to deﬁne an average one-period-ahead expectations operator. In the con-
text of Singleton’s (1987) asset pricing model with disparately but symmetrically
informed investors, the operator is used to compute the equilibrium price of the
asset. The usefulness of the operator comes from the fact that it allows us to iterate
Euler equations with ‘average expectations’ terms forward in time without relying
on the law of iterated expectations. The solved price equation then resembles a
discounted sum of expected future fundamentals.
Deriving the dynamics of higher order expectations does not solve the problem of
how to model the inﬁnite regress of expectations in practise. Again in the context of
Singleton’s (1987) model, we prove two important results towards this end. First,
we show analytically that the impact of expectations on the price of the asset
decreases as the order of expectation increases.
4 This result holds under the same
conditions that guarantee that a solution exists when agents are perfectly informed,
i.e. that the eigenvalue of the fundamental process multiplied by the discount rate
is smaller than unity in absolute value. Second, we prove that the variance of
expectations decreases as the order of expectation increases. The second result
is a direct implication of common knowledge of rational expectations and should
apply to linear models with private information more generally. Taken together,
the two results constitute the main contribution of the paper: The dynamics of
an inﬁnite horizon model with private information and with agents that optimize
intertemporally can be approximated to an arbitrary accuracy by a ﬁnite state
representation. This result is derived without relying on the common strategy of
making additional assumptions to ensure that private information is short lived.
2Some examples are Townsend (1983), Sargent (1991), Woodford (2002), Lorenzoni (2005),
Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2005), Kasa, Walker and Whiteman (2006) and Cespa and Vives
(2007).
3A similar assumption is used implicitly in both Woodford (2002) and Morris and Shin (2002)
to construct higher order expectations of the current state of the economy.
4A result with similar implications for a strategic one period game without endogenous signals
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One way to make private information short-lived is to impose that all shocks are
observed perfectly by all agents with a lag. This assumption was ﬁrst introduced
by Townsend (1983) as a way to restrict the dimension of the relevant state for
‘forecasting the forecasts of others’. Before Townsend, Lucas (1975) assumed that
the inhabitants of his island economy pooled their information between periods in
order to circumvent the inﬁnite regress problem. More recently, Bacchetta and
van Wincoop (2006) used a similar assumption to Townsend, to analyze exchange
rate dynamics. In their model, fundamentals are perfectly observed contempora-
neously, but individual investors receive a private signal of future fundamentals.
Together with projection techniques, short lived information makes it possible to
solve dynamic models with private information, but may result in kinks in the im-
pulse response functions at the lag when shocks become common knowledge. In
many settings it is also arguably unrealistic to assume that the shocks can ever be
observed, not even with very long lags.
Other strategies to restrict the state dimension can be found in for instance Allen,
Morris and Shin (2006) who set up a ﬁnite horizon model to investigate the eﬀects
of private information on the price of an asset with a terminal liquidation date.
Cespa and Vives (2007) introduce long-term traders in a model that resembles that
of Allen, Morris and Shin (2006). Lorenzoni (2006) presents a dynamic general
equilibrium model where agents are subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks
and need to infer aggregate productivity to optimally choose consumption. The
model is used to explain the origin of demand shocks. Lorenzoni assumes that an
observation far enough in the past is uninformative and truncates the state space
in the time domain.
A diﬀerent approach to solve a dynamic model with private information, that
does not rely on restricting the dimension of the state, is taken by Kasa, Walker
and Whiteman (2006). They present a simple asset price model with risk neutral
traders where the fundamentals of the asset are driven by two mutually orthogonal
stochastic processes. Traders are divided into two ‘types’ depending on which of
the stochastic processes that they can observe. Both types observe the equilibrium
price. Kasa et al then derive conditions for when the observation of the equilibrium
price does or does not reveal the information held by the other type of trader.
They also show how a solution can be found analytically, which is made possible by
conducting the analysis entirely in the frequency domain. It is not clear whether
their approach can be generalised to a setting with a large number of traders (or
types) or where traders receive information about the same underlying process,
i.e. a setting with non-orthogonal private signals, but it does oﬀer some analytical
elegance.
It was the paper by Townsend (1983) that coined the popular term ’forecasting
the forecasts of others’ to describe the inﬁnite regress problem discussed above. In
an ironic twist to the history of the topic, subsequent research, i.e. Kasa (2000) and
Pearlman and Sargent (2005), have showed that in the model studied by Townsend,
private information is not preserved when agents observe equilibrium prices so
there is actually no need for agents to ’forecast the forecasts of others’. Walker
(forthcoming) claims that this also applies to the model of Singleton studied here.
However, we demonstrate below that this result is due to additional (and special)
assumptions made by Walker that are not part of Singleton’s original set up and
that in general, private information is preserved in the Singleton set up.4 KRISTOFFER P. NIMARK
The next section deﬁnes the concept of dynamic higher order expectations and
ﬁxes notation. This is followed in Section 3 by what is hopefully an intuitive (and
in any case a detailed) account of how common knowledge of rationality can be
used to construct a law of motion for higher order expectations. Section 3 also
introduces the average one-period-ahead expectations operator mentioned above.
Section 4 presents Singleton’s model that is used as a vehicle for the rest of the
analysis. Section 5 contains the main results of the paper. There, we demonstrate
how common knowledge of rationality can be used to construct the law of motion
for higher order expectations when agents observe endogenous signals and how the
law of motion can be used to compute the price of the asset in Singleton’s model.
In Section 5 we also also prove the two results that allow us to work with a ﬁnite di-
mensional state without assuming that shocks can be observed with a lag. Section 6
contains some simulation results and Section 7 discusses how observing equilibrium
prices reveal information to individual traders and under what circumstances the
underlying state will be perfectly revealed. Section 8 concludes.
2. Concepts and notation
Before analyzing the dynamics of higher order expectations, it is necessary to
invest some time in a notational machinery as well as to deﬁne exactly what is
meant by a dynamic higher order expectation.
2.1. Contemporaneous expectations. We start be deﬁning contemporaneous
higher order expectations, i.e. higher order expectations held today of the current
value of a random variable. there is a continuum of agents indexed by j ∈ (0,1).
Agent j’s ﬁrst order expectation of the variable θt is agent j’s best estimate of the
value of the variable given his information set It(j). We denote agent j’s ﬁrst order
expectation of θt at time t
θ
(1)
t|t (j) ≡ E [θt | It(j)] (2.1)
The average ﬁrst order expectation is obtained by taking averages of (2.1) across
agents
θ
(1)
t|t ≡
Z
E [θt | It(j)] dj (2.2)
The average second order expectation is obtained by taking the average of agents’
expectations of (2.2)
θ
(2)
t|t ≡
Z
E
h
θ
(1)
t|t | It(j)
i
dj (2.3)
The average contemporaneous second order expectation of θt thus is the average
expectation at time t of the average expectation at time t of the value of θt. We
can generalize this notation to the kth order expectation of θt
θ
(k)
t|t ≡
Z
E
h
θ
(k−1)
t|t | It(j)
i
dj (2.4)
Deﬁne the zero order expectation of θt as the actual value of the variable
θ
(0)
t ≡ θt (2.5)
In general
θ
(k)
t|t 6= θ
(k+l)
t|t (2.6)DYNAMIC HIGHER ORDER EXPECTATIONS 5
for l 6= 0. We call a sequence of contemporaneous expectations, for instance from
order zero to k, a hierarchy of expectations from order zero to k. Vectors consisting
of a hierarchy of expectations are denoted
θ
(0:k)
t|t =
h
θ
(0)
t|t θ
(1)
t|t ... θ
(k)
t|t
i0
(2.7)
2.2. Dynamic higher order expectations. In this section we deﬁne and set no-
tation for two types of dynamic higher order expectations that diﬀer in how easily
they can be reduced to a function of the contemporaneous expectation hierarchy of
the same variable. This diﬀerence in turn depends on the fact that the law of iter-
ated expectations applies to only one of them. The accompanying notation should
make clear (i) the order of expectation and (ii) on what time period information
each order of expectation is conditioned on.
The law of iterated expectations can loosely be attributed to that agents do
not believe that they have ‘incorrect’ expectations so that they do not expect to
receive information in the future that will make them want to revise their own
expectations in a particular direction. The same is not true about expectations
about other’s expectations. For instance, an investor may believe that the average
‘market expectation’ of the fundamental value of an asset is incorrect, but as more
information becomes available to others over time the ‘market expectation’ will be
revised towards what the investor believes is the asset’s true value. It is the fact
that it can be rational to expect others to revise their expectations in a certain
direction that makes the law of iterated expectations inapplicable to higher order
expectations.
2.2.1. Higher order expectations conditional on current information only. The sim-
plest form of dynamic higher order expectations are expectations of what others
expect today that the value of a variable will be s periods ahead, i.e higher order
expectations based only on the information that others are believed to have access
to today. The law of iterated expectations can then be applied directly to the cur-
rent contemporaneous expectation of any order, since agents do not believe that
other agents expect to revise their own expectations.
Let the one-period-ahead expectation of the random variable θt conditional on
the current value of θt be
E [θt+1 | θt] = f(θt) (2.8)
so that the expectation of horizon s conditional on θt is
E [θt+s | θt] = fs (θt). (2.9)
That agents do not expect to revise their own expectations as time passes implies
that we can apply the transition function f to the contemporaneous expectation of
a given order to ﬁnd the dynamic expectation of the same order. The expectation
of order k at horizon s of this ‘simple’ type of dynamic higher order expectation is
thus given by
fs(θ
(k)
t|t ) (2.10)
2.2.2. Higher order expectations conditional on expected future information sets.
The static notation of contemporaneous expectations together with the transition
function f for the random variable provide suﬃcient notation for the simple type
of dynamic higher order expectations that are conditioned only on the expected
current information sets of other agents. However, this is not the form of dynamic6 KRISTOFFER P. NIMARK
higher order expectations that arises naturally in economic applications. An exam-
ple of a more interesting form of dynamic higher order expectations are expectations
in period t of average expectations in period t + 1 of the average expectation of
a random variable in period t + 2 when other agents are expected to receive new
information in period t + 1. This latter type of dynamic expectations are relevant
for optimal decision making when privately informed agents trade with each other
sequentially and each agent need to forecast what others will be willing to pay for
an asset or a good at some future date when other agents may have updated their
expectations. We thus need a notation that indicates on what time period infor-
mation sets the expectations at each order are conditioned on. Denote the average
expectation in period t of the average expectation at t + 1 of θt+2
θ
(2)
t+2|t+1|t ≡
Z
E
Z
E [θt+2 | It+1(j)] dj | It(j)

dj (2.11)
More generally, denote the k order expectation of θ at horizon k
θ
(k)
t+k|...|t ≡
Z
E[
Z
E[...
Z
E[
Z
E [θt+k | It+k−1(j)] dj | It+k−2(j) dj]
... | It+1(j)]dj | It(j)] dj (2.12)
The superscript on the term on the left hand side of (2.12) denotes the order
of the expectation, i.e. the number of times averages are taken of expectations
(and equals the number of integral signs in the expression on the right hand side).
The subscripts denotes on what time period information the diﬀerent orders of
expectations are conditioned on. In words, (2.12) thus says “the average expectation
in period t conditional on the information available to agents in period t of the
average expectation in period t+1 conditional on the information available to agents
at t+1 of the average expectation at period t+2......of the average expectation in
period t+k−1 conditional on the information available to agents in period t+k−1
of the value of θt+k”. This will in general diﬀer from the kth order expectation of
what the variable θt will be k periods ahead conditional only on the information
other agents are believed to have access to today. I.e.
θ
(k)
t+k|...|t 6= fk(θ
(k)
t|t ) (2.13)
3. The arithmetic of dynamic higher order expectations
This section gives a detailed account of the dynamics of higher order expecta-
tions. We use a simple set up with a continuum of agents that are estimating an
unobservable process. Agents are rational Bayesians in the sense that they form
optimal estimates of the process given their information sets and update their es-
timates when new information arrives by applying Bayes’ law through the Kalman
ﬁlter. This is common knowledge, i.e. all agents know that all agents know, and so
on, that all agents are rational Bayesians. In this section we provide a more formal
deﬁnition of this assumption and we demonstrate that it gives enough structure to
expectations to pin down all orders of expectations at any horizon for given initial
conditions. We also introduce an average one-period-ahead expectations operator
that maps one agent’s expectation of the current hierarchy of expectations into
what he expects the average expectation of the same hierarchy will be in the next
period. In this section, agents’ sole concern is to estimate an unobservable processDYNAMIC HIGHER ORDER EXPECTATIONS 7
and the average of other agents’ estimate of the same process. This set up is trans-
parent (but void of any economic meaning) and the hope is that it will provide
some intuition for the economically more interesting sections that follows.
3.1. Estimating a persistent process. Agents are indexed by j ∈ (0,1) and
estimate the unobservable persistent process
θt = ρθt−1 + vt (3.1)
vt ∼ N
 
0,σ2
v

In period t agent j observes the unbiased but noisy signal st(j) of the true value of
θt
st(j) = θt + ηt(j) (3.2)
ηt(j) ∼ N
 
0,σ2
η

∀ j (3.3)
Equations (3.1) and (3.2) form a state space system that can be estimated using the
Kalman ﬁlter. Agent j’s optimal estimate of θt in period t is given by the updating
equation
θ
(1)
t|t (j) = (1 − g1)ρθ
(1)
t−1|t−1(j) + g1st(j) (3.4)
g1 =
p
p + σ2
η
< 1 (3.5)
p = σ2
v + pρ2 −
(pρ)
2
p + σ2
e
(3.6)
The interpretation of (3.4) is the following. The current estimate θ
(1)
t|t is a weighted
average of the the prior ρθt−1|t−1 and the observation st(j). Intuitively, less weight
is put on a noisy observation so the Kalman gain g1 is decreasing in the variance
of the noise term ηt. The limit cases σ2
η = 0 and σ2
η = 1 implies that g1 = 1 and
g1 = 0 respectively so that σ2
η = 0 implies that the signal is a perfect indicator of
the underlying variable since st(j) = θt ∀ t,j .
3.2. Higher order estimates. In order to derive a law of motion for higher order
estimates, take averages of the updating equation (3.4) across agents and combine
it with the actual process (3.1) to get
"
θt
θ
(1)
t|t
#
=

ρ 0
g1ρ (1 − g1)ρ
"
θt−1
θ
(1)
t−1|t−1
#
+

1
g1

vt (3.7)
The system (3.7) is the joint law of motion for the actual and average ﬁrst order
expectation of θt. Higher order estimates can be added recursively by recognizing
that individual agents can form an estimate of the system (3.7) by using the Kalman
ﬁlter. The relevant state space system is then the transition (state) equation (3.7)
and the measurement equation (3.8)
st(j) =

1 0

"
θt
θ
(1)
t|t
#
+ ηt(j) (3.8)8 KRISTOFFER P. NIMARK
which is just a reformulation of (3.2). Applying standard formulas for a multivariate
Kalman ﬁlter yields the updating equation for agent j’s estimate of the system (3.7)
"
θ
(1)
t|t (j)
θ
(2)
t|t (j)
#
=
 
I −

g1
g2

1
0
0!
ρ 0
g1ρ (1 − g1)ρ
"
θ
(1)
t−1|t−1(j)
θ
(2)
t−1|t−1(j)
#
(3.9)
+

g1
g2
 
1
0
0 "
θt
θ
(1)
t|t
#
+ ηt(j)
!
where g1 and g2 are the elements of the Kalman gain matrix. Taking averages of
(3.9) across agents and amending it to (3.1) yields the law of motion for estimates
of θt from order zero to two.



θ
(0)
t
θ
(1)
t|t
θ
(2)
t|t


 =


ρ 0 0
g1ρ (1 − g1)ρ 0
g2ρ (g1 − g2)ρ (1 − g1)ρ





θ
(0)
t−1
θ
(1)
t−1|t−1
θ
(2)
t−1|t−1


 +


1
g1
g2

vt (3.10)
We could in principle repeat this procedure to form ever larger state space systems,
including higher and higher orders of estimates. However, the three dimensional
system (3.10) is suﬃcient to illustrate how common knowledge of rationality can
be used to construct a law of motion for higher order expectations.
3.3. Expectations dynamics and common knowledge of rationality. Above,
we implicitly assumed that rational expectations were common knowledge to derive
the law of motion for the hierarchy of contemporaneous expectations (3.10): Indi-
vidual agents used their knowledge of the process (3.1) - (3.2) and the information
available to them to form their best estimates of θt. To estimate the average esti-
mate of θt individual agents used their knowledge of the actual updating equation
of other agents (3.4) to form a second order estimate of θt. Common knowledge of
rationality simply means that agents’ ﬁrst order expectations are rational expecta-
tions of the actual value of the variable, that second order expectations are rational
expectations of average ﬁrst order expectations, that third order expectations are
rational expectation of average second order expectations, and so on. Assumption
1 formalises this notion and extends it to also include higher order expectations of
endogenous variables.
Assumption 1: It is common knowledge that agents’ expectations are
rational (model consistent). Let M : R∞ → R∞ be a mapping from the hier-
archy of contemporaneous expectations of θt in period t to the expected hierarchy
of contemporaneous expectations in period t+1 conditional on actual hierarchy in
period t
E
h
θ
(0:∞)
t+1|t+1 | θ
(0:∞)
t|t
i
≡ M

θ
(0:∞)
t|t

(3.11)
and let Ms ≡ M

M

....M

θ
(0:∞)
t|t

so that
E
h
θ
(0:∞)
t+s|t+s | θ
(0:∞)
t|t
i
= Ms

θ
(0:∞)
t|t

(3.12)
Common knowledge of rational expectations then implies that
E
h
θ
(0:∞)
t+s|t+s | θ
(k:∞)
t|t
i
= Ms

θ
(k:∞)
t|t

∀k,s ≥ 0 (3.13)DYNAMIC HIGHER ORDER EXPECTATIONS 9
Let A : R∞ → R be a mapping from the complete hierarchy of contemporaneous
expectations of θt in period t to the endogenous variable zt in period t
z
(0)
t = A

θ
(0:∞)
t|t

(3.14)
Common knowledge of rational expectations then implies that
E
h
z
(0)
t+s | θ
(k:∞)
t|t
i
= A

Ms

θ
(k:∞)
t|t

∀k,s ≥ 0 (3.15)
Assumption 1 is a natural generalisation of the full (or common) information ra-
tional expectations assumption. To see this, note that (3.11) - (3.15) imply that if
agents share the same contemporaneous expectation hierarchy of the fundamental
θt, they will also share the same expectations of future hierarchies of contempora-
neous expectations and of future endogenous variables.
The mapping M represents the actual law of motion for the contemporaneous
expectations hierarchy. For something to be ‘common knowledge’ it is not enough
that something is commonly believed, it must also be true. Setting k = 1 in (3.13)
and (3.15) makes agents’ expectations rational. That (3.13) applies to all k ≥ 0
makes it common knowledge.
3.4. A one-period ahead average expectations operator. In this section we
deﬁne an operator that can be used to compute dynamic higher order expectations
conditional on the expected future information sets of other agents. Let
θ
(0:∞)
t|t = Mθ
(0:∞)
t−1|t−1 + Nvt (3.16)
describe the law of motion for the contemporaneous expectation hierarchy θ
(0:∞)
t|t .
The diﬀerence equation (3.16) is the inﬁnite dimensional equivalent of (3.10). Com-
mon knowledge of rational expectations then implies that
Z
E
h
θ
(0:∞)
t+1|t+1 | It(j)
i
dj =
Z
Mθ
(1:∞)
t|t (j)dj (3.17)
or equivalently
Z
E
h
θ
(0:∞)
t+1|t+1 | It(j)
i
dj = M

0∞×1 I

θ
(0:∞)
t|t (3.18)
Deﬁne a new operator M : R∞ → R∞
M ≡ M

0∞×1 I

(3.19)
Applying the operator M to an expectation hierarchy does two things: It moves
expectations one step ‘up’ in orders of expectations since
θ
(k+1:∞)
t|t =

0∞×1 I

θ
(k:∞)
t|t (3.20)
and one step forward in time by (3.16). The diﬀerence between M and M is
that M is a mapping from an agent’s current estimate of θ
(0:∞)
t|t to the same agent’s
estimate of what θ
(0:∞)
t|t will be tomorrow, while M maps an agent’s current estimate
of θ
(0:∞)
t|t into what he believe others (on average) expect θ
(0:∞)
t|t to be tomorrow. M
can therefore be used to compute dynamic higher order expectations of the form
θ
(k)
t+k|...|t ≡
Z
E[
Z
E[...
Z
E[
Z
E [θt+k | It+k−1(j)] dj | It+k−2(j) dj] (3.21)
... | It+1(j)]dj | It(j)] dj (3.22)10 KRISTOFFER P. NIMARK
for a given current hierarchy contemporaneous expectations θ
(0:∞)
t|t since
θ
(k)
t+k|...|t = e0
1M
k
θ
(0:∞)
t|t (3.23)
where e0
1 is a row vector that picks out the ﬁrst element of a column vector.
The two operators M and M can thus be used to compute any order of expec-
tation at any horizon, and the choice between the two depends on the particular
question at hand. In the simple set up of this section we did not have a model to
motivate why agents were interested in forecasting other agents’ expectations. In
the next section, we present a model where privately informed traders buy and sell
a long lived asset. In that model, traders will need to form higher order expecta-
tions about expectations that other traders will hold at some point in the future
when new signals have arrived and the information sets of other traders have been
updated. In that setting, the operator M will be used to compute the current
equilibrium price of the asset.5
4. The Singleton Asset Pricing Model
In the previous section, higher order expectations were discussed without any
references to a model to motivate why agents needed to form higher order ex-
pectations. In this section we present a version of the model of Singleton (1987)
with disparately informed traders that will serve as the vehicle for the argument of
the rest of the paper. Having an explicit model not only make the analysis more
interesting, it also allows us to introduce endogenous signals.
Singleton presents and solves a number of models that diﬀer slightly in their
patterns of persistence and assumed structural parameter values. In what he refers
to as Models 1-7, the unobservable fundamental process follows an MA(2) process
and in Models 8-12 it follows an AR(1). In the ﬁrst class of models, a ﬁnite dimen-
sional state representation can be found without making strong assumptions about
the revelation of the shocks since a private signal about a MA(2) process does not
carry information that is useful for forecasts beyond a two period horizon. Pri-
vate information about an AR(1) process on the other hand is long lived. To solve
the second class of models, Singleton assumes that the innovations to the AR(1)
process are perfectly and publicly observed with a two period lag. This allows him
to derive an accurate and ﬁnite dimensional state representation. The rest of this
paper uses the same set up as in Singleton’s Models 8-12 as a vehicle to show how
dynamic models with private information can be solved without assuming that the
shocks to the hidden process ever become common knowledge.
4.1. Model Set Up. There is a continuum of competitive traders indexed by
j ∈ (0,1) who at time t divide their wealth between a risky asset with price pt and
coupon payment ct and a risk free asset with return r. The wealth of trader j then
evolves according to
wt+1(j) = zt(j)[pt+1 + ct+1] − [zt(j)pt − wt(j)](1 + r) (4.1)
5Allen, Morris and Shin (2006) deﬁnes an average belief operator E : R2 → R2. The operator
E maps the average k order expectations of the average signal vector into k +1 order expectaions
of the same vector and can be used to compute higher order expectations of the state since the
static setting results in a proportional relationship between higher order beliefs. In our model,
the elements of N in the law of motion (3.16) could be generated by a similar operator if θt was
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where zt(j) is the asset holdings of trader j who chooses his portfolio to maximize
E
h
−e−γwt+1(j) | It(j)
i
(4.2)
and It(j) is the information set of trader j at time t (deﬁned below). The coupon
payments follow the known autoregressive process
ct = c + ψct−1 + ut (4.3)
ut ∼ N
 
0,σ2
u

Maximizing (4.2) subject to (4.1) yields agent j’s optimal demand for the risky
asset
zd
t (j) =
(E [pt+1 | It(j)] − (1 + r)pt) + (c + ψct)
γδ
(4.4)
where δ is the conditional variance of (pt+1 + ct+1). The supply of the asset at time
t, zs
t, depends linearly on the price pt and additively on the persistent stochastic
shock θt and the i.i.d. disturbance t
zs
t = ξpt + θt + t (4.5)
θt = ρθt−1 + vt (4.6)

t vt
0
∼ N

0,

σ2
 0
0 σ2
v

(4.7)
Equating net demand and supply
Z
zd
t (j) = zs
t (4.8)
yields the equilibrium price
pt = λ
Z
E [pt+1 | It(j)] dj

+ λψct − δγλ[θt + t] (4.9)
where
λ ≡
1
ξγδ + (1 + r)
. (4.10)
4.2. Traders’ Information Sets. The basic structure of the model described
above is identical to Model 8-12 in Singleton (1983). Where the present paper
diﬀer is in the assumption on what traders can observe. In Singleton’s paper the
information set of trader j at time t is given by
IS
t = {st−T(j),pt−T,ct−T : T ≥ 0;vt−T,t−T : T ≥ 2} (4.11)
where
st(j) = θt + ηt(j) (4.12)
ηt(j) ∼ N
 
0,σ2
η

∀ j (4.13)
Each trader observes the price of the asset, pt, and the coupon payment, ct, per-
fectly. The persistent component θt of the supply process is not perfectly revealed
by the observation of the price due to the unobservable transitory supply shock
t. Trader j also observes a private signal st(j) of the persistent supply process θt
and it is due to the private measurement error ηt(j) that the need to ’forecast the
forecasts of others’ arises. Singleton uses a similar method to overcome the inﬁnite
dimension of the state as Townsend (1983), i.e. he assumes that the shocks to the
supply process become known to all traders after a ﬁnite number of periods (which12 KRISTOFFER P. NIMARK
in Singleton’s case is after two periods). This allows for a ﬁnite dimensional time
series representation of the model.
While the assumption of public revelation of shocks with a lag is convenient from
a modeling perspective, it is not an assumption that is always realistic. We want
to solve the model without imposing that all shocks are observed perfectly after a
ﬁnite number of periods. The information set of our trader is therefore given by
It(j) = {st−T(j),pt−T,ct−T : T ≥ 0} (4.14)
Traders thus form expectations about the future price of the asset by observing the
private signal st(j), the commonly observable price pt and the coupon payment ct.
It is common knowledge that all traders choose their portfolio to maximize (4.2)
subject to the structural equations (4.3) - (4.6).
4.3. The common information solution. To solve the model we need to inte-
grate out the average expectations term
R
E [pt+1 | It(j)] dj. Under full information,
this could be done by iterating (4.9) forward, yielding the solved price equation
pt =
λψ
1 − λψ
ct −
δγλ
1 − λρ
θt − δγλt (4.15)
if |λψ| < 1 and |λρ| < 1. With imperfect but common information sets, the solution
has the similar form
pt =
λψ
1 − λψ
ct − δγλθt −
δγλ2ρ
1 − λρ
θ
(1)
t|t − δγλt (4.16)
where the actual supply disturbance θt in the geometric sum is replaced by the
common ﬁrst order estimate. Both of these solutions exploits the law of iterated
expectations, but as demonstrated in the previous section, the law of iterated ex-
pectations is not generally applicable to higher order expectations. The next section
derives an algorithm to solve the model when traders have private information.
5. A Solution Algorithm
This section presents the solution algorithm for the model described above. To
solve the model we need to ﬁnd an appropriate representation of the state and the
law of motion of the state. We also need to derive a mapping from the state to
the price of the asset, using the state’s law of motion. Finding the price function
also includes computing the conditional variance δ of the sum of the price and the
coupon payment, since this partly determines the rate at which expected future
prices of the asset are discounted. The algorithm describes a ﬁxed point problem
in three steps.
5.1. Step 1: Computing the price. The ﬁrst step of the solution is to ﬁnd the
price of the bond as a function of the contemporaneous expectation hierarchy of
the supply disturbance θ
(0:∞)
t|t for a given law of motion of the hierarchy and a given
conditional variance of (pt + ct), δ. The hierarchy of expectations is thus, together
with the perfectly observable ct and the transitory shock t, the state of the model
and the price function resembles a standard discounted expected sum of future
fundamentals.DYNAMIC HIGHER ORDER EXPECTATIONS 13
Proposition 1. Conjecture (to be veriﬁed below) that the expectation hierarchy
θ
(0:∞)
t|t follows a vector AR(1) process of the form
θ
(0:∞)
t|t = Mθ
(0:∞)
t−1|t−1 + N

vt
t

(5.1)
The price function
pt = λ
Z
E [pt+1 | It(j)] dj

+ λψct − δγλ[θt + t] (5.2)
can then be equivalently represented by a linear function of the contemporaneous
expectation hierarchy, i.e.
pt = aθ
(0:∞)
t|t +
λψ
1 − λψ
ct − δγλt (5.3)
= λ
Z
E [pt+1 | It(j)] dj

+ λψct − δγλ[θt + t] (5.4)
where
a = − δγλe1

I − λM
−1
(5.5)
and
M ≡ M

0∞×1 I

(5.6)
Proof. In the Appendix. 
The computation of a is conceptually similar to computing the expected dis-
counted sum of future fundamentals under perfect (or imperfect but common) in-
formation. The diﬀerence in a set up with private information is that when (5.2) is
iterated forward, we take repeated averages of expectations across investors. The
fact that investors re-optimize their asset holdings in every period means that the
price today depends on the average expectation of the price tomorrow, but the
price tomorrow does not depend on what agents expect today that the price of the
asset will be the day after tomorrow. Instead, the price tomorrow depends on what
agents will believe tomorrow that the price will be the day after tomorrow. Agents
therefore need to form expectations today of the average expectation tomorrow of
the price of the asset the day after tomorrow and so on. This is the reason why we
need to use the operator M (rather than M) that moves expectations both forward
in time and ‘upwards’ in the hierarchy of expectations to compute the current price.
5.2. Step 2: The dynamics of the expectation hierarchy. This section shows
how to ﬁnd the law of motion for the hierarchy of expectations (5.1) for a given
vector a and conditional variance δ. The traders estimate the state of the model
recursively, by applying the Kalman ﬁlter to the current price and the private signal
of the supply disturbance. Computing the Kalman gain requires that the law of
motion of the state that is being estimated is known. The state consists of the actual
supply disturbance θ
(0)
t|t and the hierarchy of expectations of the supply disturbance
θ
(1:k)
t|t , so the law of motion of the state is determined by the actual supply process
(4.6) and the law of motion of the higher order estimates. The Kalman ﬁlter thus
plays a dual role: it both determines the traders’ estimate of the state as well as
the law of motion of the very same state that the traders are estimating.
Conceptually, the procedure to construct the law of motion for the hierarchy of
expectations here is the same as that of the simple set up in Section 3. The only14 KRISTOFFER P. NIMARK
diﬀerence is that traders now also observe an endogenous signal of the state, i.e.
the price of the asset. The observable variables in the measurement equation then
depend on the complete hierarchy of expectations from order zero to inﬁnity, so we
cannot add orders of expectations to the system one by one as we did in Section
3. Instead, we need to ﬁnd an expression for the law of motion of the complete
hierarchy of expectations from order zero to inﬁnity simultaneously.
Trader j estimates the hierarchy of contemporaneous expectations recursively,
using the Kalman ﬁlter updating equation (5.7)
θ
(1:∞)
t|t (j) = Mθ
(1:∞)
t−1|t−1(j) + K

St(j) − LMθ
(1:∞)
t−1|t−1(j) − Qct

(5.7)
St(j) =

st(j)
pt

(5.8)
Q =

0
λψ
1−λψ

(5.9)
where St(j) is the vector containing the private signal of the supply process st(j) and
the current price of the asset, pt. M is the transition matrix from the conjectured
law of motion (5.1). The term Qct subtracts the impact of the known coupon
payment process on the price and the term in parenthesis in (5.7) is thus the surprise
component of the observation, i.e. the innovation in the updating equation. The
matrix L maps the expected state Mθ
(1:k)
t−1|t−1 into an expected observation and is
given by
L =

e0
1
a

(5.10)
K is the Kalman gain matrix (deﬁned below).
We want to ﬁnd the conjectured vector AR(1) law of motion (5.1) for the hierar-
chy of average contemporaneous expectations, that is, we want to ﬁnd the matrices
M and N. We thus need to integrate the state updating equation (5.7) across
traders and express all remaining terms as functions of the lagged expectation hi-
erarchy θ
(0:∞)
t−1|t−1 and the two structural innovations vt and t. Use the deﬁnition of
the private signal st(j) (4.12), the price equation (5.3) and that the idiosyncratic
noise ‘washes out’ in aggregation since
R
ηt(j) dj = 0 to write the average signal St
as
St = LMθ
(0:∞)
t−1|t−1 + LN

vt
t

+

0
−δγλt

(5.11)
Substituting the average signal (5.11) into the updating equation (5.7) gives the
law of motion of the average of traders’ estimate of the state
θ
(1:∞)
t|t = (I − KL)Mθ
(1:∞)
t−1|t−1 + KLMθ
(0:∞)
t−1|t−1 + KLN

vt
t

+ K

0
−δγλt

(5.12)
The ﬁnal step to get the conjectured form (5.1) is to collect terms and append the
actual supply disturbance process
θt = ρθt−1 + vt (5.13)DYNAMIC HIGHER ORDER EXPECTATIONS 15
to the updating equation (5.12). The matrices M and N in the conjectured law of
motion (5.1) are then given by
M =

ρ 0
0 0

+

0
KLM

+

0 0
0 (I − KL)M

(5.14)
N =

e0
1
KLN

+

0 0
0 −K2δγλ

(5.15)
and the equilibrium Kalman gain matrix for this system is
K = PL0(LPL0 + Ση)−1 (5.16)
P = M(P − PL0(LPL0 + Σεε)−1LP)M0 + Σθθ (5.17)
Ση =

σ2
η 0
0 σ2


(5.18)
Σθθ = N

σ2
v 0
0 σ2


N0 (5.19)
Proposition 2. The transition matrix M is lower triangular, all elements are of
the same sign as ρ and the elements of each row sum to ρ.
Proof. In the Appendix 
In the simple example of Section 3, we could see that the transition matrix for
the state equation was lower triangular. That this is also the case when agents can
observe endogenous signals is not obvious, since higher order expectations aﬀect the
observed price and could therefore in principle aﬀect lower order expectations. That
the dynamics of lower order estimates are independent of higher order estimates
will make it easier to show that the inﬁnite dimensional system considered so far
can be approximated to an arbitrary accuracy by a ﬁnite dimensional system. That
all elements are of the same sign as ρ is a direct implication of common knowledge
of rational expectations and the properties of the Kalman ﬁlter. The third part of
the proposition that the rows of M sum to ρ is also an implication of that rational
expectations are common knowledge: If all orders of expectations coincide, then all
orders of expected future values of θt must coincide as well. This will only be the
case if the rows of M sum to ρ.
Proposition 3. If the actual supply process {θt} follows an AR(1) with coeﬃcient
ρ, then the largest eigenvalue of M is ρ.
Proof. Proposition 3 is a direct implication of Proposition 2. The eigenvalues of
a lower triangular matrix are the elements along the diagonal (see Strang 1988),
which by Proposition 2 are restricted to lie in the interval (0,ρ). 
Proposition 3 implies that (5.1) is a stable process and that a solution to the
price equation exists when a ﬁxed point for the law of motion exists.
5.3. Step 3: The conditional variance. The conditional variance of (ct+1 +
pt+1), δ, is the variance of investors’ forecast error of the sum ct+1 +pt+1 based on16 KRISTOFFER P. NIMARK
their period t information sets. The conditional forecast error is given by
δ = b ab Pb a0 +
"
1 + 2
λψ
1 − λψ
+

λψ
1 − λψ
2#
σ2
u (5.20)
b a =

a −δγλ

(5.21)
where b P is the one period ahead joint forecast error covariance matrix of t and
the hierarchy of expectations of θt. Details on how to compute b P are given in the
Appendix.
5.4. A ﬁnite dimensional state representation. The derivations above contain
inﬁnite dimensional matrices and vectors. Below we present and prove a proposition
that the inﬁnite dimensional model solution derived above can be approximated to
an arbitrary accuracy by a ﬁnite dimensional representation. The ground work
for the proof is provided by two preceding lemmas. The ﬁrst proves that the im-
pact of contemporaneous expectations approaches zero as the order of expectation
increases. The second proves that the variance of contemporaneous expectations
decreases as the order of expectation increases. Taken together, these two results
imply that there is an upper bound on the variance of the approximation error
introduced by limiting the model to include only a ﬁnite number of orders of ex-
pectations. The upper bound of the approximation error variance is decreasing
(at least) geometrically as the maximum number of orders included in the model
increases. The approximation error introduced by truncating the state at a maxi-
mum order of expectation k can thus be made arbitrarily small by choosing a large
enough k.
Lemma 1. Denote the elements of the vector a =

a1 a2 a3 ··· a∞

. The
kth element of a is smaller than
|ak| ≤
 


δγλ
1 − λρ
(λρ)
k−1
 

 (5.22)
and
lim
k→∞
ak = 0 (5.23)
Proof. That the matrix M in the law of motion (5.1) is lower triangular implies
that a kth order contemporaneous expectation does not aﬀect expectations in the
forward iteration of (5.2) (using the operator M) of lower order than k. That the
elements of the rows of M sum to ρ imply that future higher order expectations
of θt with horizon s are convex combinations of lower order expectations times ρs.
The maximum impact a kth order contemporaneous expectation can have on the
current price is therefore if the kth order contemporaneous expectation completely
determines all expectations of order and horizon > k so that
θ
(k+s)
t+k+s|...|t = ρsθ
(k)
t|t ∀ s > 0 (5.24)
Iterating the price function forward, substituting in (5.24) and discounting by λ
yields (5.22). That the sequence {ak}
∞
k=0 converges to zero is implied by 0 ≤ |λρ| <
1. Both δ and λare endogenous variables, but the product δγλ is bounded by the
deﬁnition of λ (4.10) to lie in the interval

0, 1
γ

so the limit (5.23) holds for all
permissable values of δ and λ. DYNAMIC HIGHER ORDER EXPECTATIONS 17
Note that the condition 0 ≤ |λρ| < 1 that is required for the limit of the se-
quence {ak}
∞
k=1 to be zero is the same as what is required in the full (or common)
information case for the model to be stable.
Lemma 2. Common knowledge of rational expectation imply that the unconditional
variance of expectations decreases as the order of expectation increases, i.e.
E
h
θ
(k)
t|t θ
(k)
t|t
i
≥ E
h
θ
(k+1)
t|t θ
(k+1)
t|t
i
(5.25)
Proof. Any two orders of expectation obey the identity
θ
(k)
t|t ≡ θ
(k+1)
t|t − e
(k+1)
t (5.26)
where e
(k+1)
t is deﬁned as the k + 1 order expectation error. The variance of the
left hand side of (5.26) must equal the variance of the right hand side
E
h
θ
(k)
t|t θ
(k)
t|t
i
= E
h
θ
(k+1)
t|t θ
(k+1)
t|t
i
+ E
h
e
(k+1)
t e
(k+1)
t
i
− 2E
h
θ
(k+1)
t|t e
(k+1)
t
i
The proof follows from the fact that variances are non-negative and that the co-
variance between the estimate and the error must be zero
E
h
θ
(k+1)
t|t e
(k+1)
t
i
= 0. (5.27)
That the covariance between the estimate and the error is zero is implied by ratio-
nality. To see why, consider a candidate estiamte θ
∗(k+1)
t|t . If the covariance was not
zero, a better estimate b θ
(k+1)
t|t could be found by subtracting the projection of the
error on the candidate estimate
b θ
(k+1)
t|t = θ
∗(k+1)
t|t −
E
h
θ
(k+1)
t|t e
(k+1)
t
i
E
h
θ
(k+1)
t|t θ
(k+1)
t|t
iθ
∗(k+1)
t|t
so if the candidate θ
∗(k+1)
t|t is an optimal estimate of θ
(k)
t|t , then (5.27) must hold. 
Lemma 1 and 2 provide the ground work for the next proposition that when
proved allows us to work with a ﬁnite dimensional representation of the model,
where the required state dimension depends on the desired accuracy of the solution.
Proposition 4. When a solution to the pricing equation (4.9) exists, it can be
approximated to an arbitrary accuracy by
pt = a0:kθ
(0:k)
t|t +
λψ
1 − λψ
ct − δγλt (5.28)
where k is a ﬁnite positive integer and
θ
(0:k)
t|t ≡
h
θ
(0)
t|t θ
(1)
t|t ... θ
(k)
t|t ... θ
(k)
t|t
i0
(5.29)
a0:k ≡

a0 a1 ... ak ... ak

(5.30)
i.e. there exists a k ∈ N such that
E

aθ
(0:∞)
t|t − a0:kθ
(0:k)
t|t
2
< ε : 0 < ε18 KRISTOFFER P. NIMARK
Proof. The approximation error variance is given by
E

aθ
(0:∞)
t|t − a0:kθ
(0:k)
t|t
2
(5.31)
= E

ak:∞θ
(k:∞)
t|t
2
= ak:∞E
h
θ
(k:∞)
t|t θ
(k:∞)0
t|t
i
a0
k:∞
which by lemma 1 and 2 can be made arbitrarily small by choosing a large enough
k. 
By (5.22), the elements of a decreases at least geometrically so the sum of the
sequence {ak}
∞
k=1 also converges, but we also know what the sum converges to.
Common knowledge of rational expectations imply that the sum must converge to
∞ X
k=1
ak =
δγλ
1 − λρ
(5.32)
i.e. the sum of the elements in a must be equal to the coeﬃceint on θt in the
full information solution (4.15) of the price equation since if by chance all orders of
contemporaneous expectations of θt coincide, then so must all dynamic higher order
expectaions θt which means that the law of iterated expectations apply and that
present discounted value of future expected values of θt must be given by (5.32).
5.5. Finding a ﬁxed point. Solving the model implies ﬁnding a ﬁxed point of
equations (5.5),(5.14),(5.15),(5.16),(5.17) and (5.20). In practise we also need to
choose a maximum order of expectations to include in the representation of the
model. A tolerance criteria can be formulated as a ratio of the maximum ap-
proximation error variance (5.31) over the total variance of the asset’s price. By
Proposition 4, this ratio will approach zero as the maximum order k is increased.
6. Private Information and Asset Price Dynamics
In the previous section we showed that the impact of higher order expectations
on the price of the asset price decreases as the order of expectation increases. If
the impact decreases too quickly, higher order expectations may become irrelevant.
Indeed, Singleton found that what mattered most in his model was that agents had
imperfect information, rather than private information per se. In this section we
show that this is not a general result, but highly dependent on how the model is
parameterized. Broadly speaking, the privateness of information will matter more
when expectations about the future matter more. That is, parameterizations that
imply little discounting of the future or where the unobservable supply process
is highly persistent will imply a larger diﬀerence in the price dynamics between
the assumptions of private signals versus the case of equally precise but common
signals.6 Obviously, parameterisations that imply little information imperfections
at all will also result in small diﬀerences between private and common information
price dynamics.
6Under common information it is assumed to be common knowledge that all traders observe
the same unbiased signal st = θt + ηt where ηt ∼ N
￿
0,σ2
η
￿
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Figure 1. Price impulse responses under Singleton’s baseline calibration
6.1. The role of the discount rate and the variances of shocks. Singleton’s
baseline calibration was to set

γ,ξ,ψ,ρ,r,σ2
u,σ2
v,σ2
,σ2
ηi,
	
=
{2,1.5,0.7,0.8,0.02,0.1,1,1,2}. Figure 1 shows that this parameterisation does
not imply very large diﬀerences between the full (solid line), private (dashed line),
common (dotted line) information cases. This is partly due to the large speciﬁed
variances. Since the conditional variance δ enters into the parameter λ that dis-
counts the impact of higher order expectations on the price of the asset, so choosing
variances are not just a matter of normalization. With the above parameterisation
λ equals 0.27, or that a unit increase in the average expected price of the asset in
period t + 1 implies an increase of only 0.27 in the price in period t. Multiplying
the variances of the Singleton’s baseline calibration by 0.01, increases the value of
λ to 0.96. Figure 2 shows that with lower exogenous variances we get much larger
diﬀerences between the price response to a persistent supply shock under full, pri-
vate, and common information. This is because the higher order expectations in
the sum (5.5) are discounted less, implying that the diﬀerences between ﬁrst and
higher order expectations matter more.
For both parameterisations above, the responses to the transitory shocks were
similar across the three information structures. We can choose parameters such
that we get large diﬀerences between the full, private and common information
structures for both persistent and transitory shocks. The key is to not choose the
variance of either the persistent or transitory supply shock to be too large relative
to the other, since traders will attribute most (of the surprise component) of what20 KRISTOFFER P. NIMARK
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Figure 2. Price impulse responses with low exogenous variances
they observe to the shock with the dominant innovation variance. A parameteri-
sation that achieves this balance and result in large diﬀerences in the responses to
both persistent and transitory shocks is to set

γ,ξ,ψ,ρ,r,σ2
u,σ2
v,σ2
,σ2
ηi,
	
equal
to {1,1.5,0.5,0.9,0.01,0.01,.1,0.001,1}. The impulse of this parameterisation is
displayed in Figure 3 where we can see that the diﬀerent information structures im-
ply very diﬀerent price dynamics. Both private and common imperfect information
results in weaker initial responses to a persistent supply shock compared to the full
information case. The responses to the transitory shock has the opposite pattern in
the impact period, i.e. information imperfections increases the ﬁrst period response
of the asset’s price to a transitory shock. The reason for this is that the conditional
variance of ct + pt, δ, is lower when traders have imperfect information since this
reduces the volatility of the price response to persistent shocks. (The impact of
the transitory shock is the shock multiplied by −δγλ.) Imperfect information also
makes the price response to a transitory shock persistent and the persistence is
stronger with private signals than with an equally precise common signal.
7. Endogenous signals and revelation of the state
In the model presented above, traders observe the price of the asset and the
price conveys some information to individual traders not only about the persistent
supply process θt but also about the (higher order) expectations of other traders.
Walker (forthcoming) has recently argued that in an environment like the Singleton
model, equilibrium prices completely reveal the state of the model and therefore
there is no need for traders to ‘forecast the forecast of others’, since all agents willDYNAMIC HIGHER ORDER EXPECTATIONS 21
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Figure 3. Price impulse responses
share the same expectations. However, Walker does not actually prove this result
using any of the original models presented in Singletons’s paper. Instead, Walker
enlarges the information sets of the traders by making the additional assumption
that traders can observe one component of the supply disturbance directly. In
equilibrium, the price of the asset then reveals the second component of the supply
disturbance perfectly.
Walker uses frequency domain methods to derive conditions for when prices
reveal the state to the traders in the Singleton model. These conditions amount
to checking whether the equilibrium MA representation of the vector of traders’
signals has any roots inside the unit circle. If all roots are outside the unit circle,
then traders can back out all past innovations to the system perfectly. There is a
simpler way: If equilibrium prices reveal the state perfectly, then the equilibrium in
question must be the full information equilibrium. It is thus suﬃcient to check if the
matrix that maps the period t state into trader j’s vector of period t observations
using the full information solution is invertible. If it isn’t, then there exists no fully
revealing equilibrium.
In our model, each trader observes the coupon payment ct, the price pt and the
private signal st(j). From the full information solution (4.15) and the information22 KRISTOFFER P. NIMARK
set of trader j (4.14) we can write down trader j’s observation equation as


ct
pt
st(j)

 =



λψ
1−λψ 0 0 0
0 −
δγλ
1−λρ −δγλ 0
0 1 0 1



| {z }
b L




ct
θt
t
ηt(j)



 (7.1)
Clearly, the matrix b L is not invertible. By assuming that either θt or t is observable,
Walker in eﬀect adds a row to b L which makes it invertible. Below, we argue that
Walker’s result can also be understood as an outcome of a special parameterisation
of Singleton’s model.
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Figure 4. Impulse responses of θ
(0:50)
t|t to a unit innovation vt
In the framework presented here, a perfectly revealing equilibrium price mani-
fests itself by making all orders of expectations of θt coincide at all times so that
θ
(k)
t|t = θ
(0)
t|t ∀ k,t. The top panel of Figure 4 illustrates the response of the hier-
archy of expectations of θt from order zero to 50 to a unit innovation in θt. (TheDYNAMIC HIGHER ORDER EXPECTATIONS 23
parameterisation is the same as that used for Figure 3.) The thick solid line is the
response of the actual shock, or θ
(0)
t|t , the dashed line immediately beneath it is the
ﬁrst order expectations, the dotted line next is the second order expectation and
so on.7 The transitory supply shock t functions as aggregate noise that prevents
the price from perfectly revealing θt. If we decrease its variance, equilibrium prices
will be more informative about θt and other traders’ (higher order) expectations of
θt. This can be seen in the mid panel of Figure 5, where we have plotted a second
impulse response function for the hierarchy θ
(0:50)
t|t . The variance of t in the mid
panel is set to 1/10 of that in the top panel. It is clear that decreasing the variance
of the transitory shock makes all orders of expectations move closer together, i.e.
making traders better informed about all orders of expectations of θt.
From a ﬁltering perspective, setting the variance of t equal to zero is equivalent
to making it perfectly observable. The bottom panel of Figure 4 demonstrates that
the model with σ2
 = 0 replicates the result of Walker: Equilibrium prices perfectly
reveal the value of θt so that all orders of expectations coincide and the graph
collapses to a single line. However, this is is not a general property of Singleton’s
model, but an artefact of the additional assumptions that σ2
 = 0, or equivalently,
that traders can observe t perfectly.
8. Conclusions
In this paper we derive a method for solving dynamic models with private infor-
mation. The principal diﬃculty of solving models in this class is the inﬁnite regress
of expectations arising from agents’ need to ‘forecast the forecasts of others’. Here,
we demonstrate how the inﬁnite regress problem can be made tractable by imposing
some structure on expectations. Speciﬁcally, it is common knowledge that agents
are rational Bayesians. This assumption allows us to derive the dynamics of higher
order expectations explicitly and transparently.
We use the structure imposed on expectations by common knowledge of ratio-
nality to solve a version of Singleton’s (1987) asset pricing model with privately
informed traders. By deﬁning an average one-period-ahead expectations operator,
we derive an expression for the price of the asset as a geometric sum that resembles
the present discounted value of expected future fundamentals. The word ’resem-
bles’ is used with care to indicate that while the functional form is similar to the
corresponding expression in a full information model, there is an important dif-
ference since the price function is not derived by relying on the law of iterated
expectations. Instead, the operator is used to compute a convergent sequence of
higher order expectations of the future price of the asset. The current price of the
asset is given by the discounted sum of this sequence.
Determining the dynamics of higher order expectations and how these map into
the price of an asset does not by it self solve the inﬁnite regress problem. However,
it does provide us with a framework that is tractable enough to derive conditions
under which the model can be approximated to an arbitrary accuracy by a ﬁnite
dimensional state representation. Incidentally, this is the same condition that guar-
antees that a stable solution exists in the full (or common) information case: If the
discount rate multiplied by the eigenvalue of the fundamental process is smaller
7Figure 4 also provides a nice illustration of Lemma 2.24 KRISTOFFER P. NIMARK
than unity in absolute value, we only need to model a ﬁnite number of orders of
expectations to achieve any required degree of accuracy.
It was Townsend’s (1983) paper that coined the term ’forecasting the forecasts of
others’. Subsequent research, i.e. Kasa (2000) and Pearlman and Sargent (2005),
have showed that in the model studied by Townsend, private information is not
preserved when agents observe equilibrium prices so there is actually no need for
agents to ’forecast the forecasts of others’. Walker (forthcoming) claims that this
also applies to the model of Singleton studied here. However, above we argued
that this result is due to additional (and special) assumptions that are made by
Walker that are not part of Singleton’s original set up. In the model presented
here, the number of innovations in each period relative to the number of signals
are suﬃcient to ensure that equilibrium prices do not fully reveal the underlying
state. We proposed a simple way to verify this based on that if equilibrium prices
are fully revealing, then the equilibrium must be the full information equilibrium.
(The same method can be used to verify that prices are also not fully revealing in
Singleton’s original information structure.)
The literature has to date produced a wealth of qualitative results derived from
the interactions that arise between agents when each individual has access to his
own piece of information. A natural next step is to test whether these qualitative
results hold up when subjected to quantitative scrutiny. The solution method pro-
posed in this paper allows us to solve dynamic models with private information
accurately (and quickly) without making some of the modelling compromises pre-
viously thought to be necessary. In addition, the method delivers the solved model
in a form that that can be estimated directly by maximum likelihood methods.
The hope is that this paper will help shorten the step from qualitative to quanti-
tative results by opening up the possibility of using dynamic models with privately
informed agents that are realistic enough to use for empirical work.
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Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1
Let the expectation hierarchy θ
(0:∞)
t|t follow a stable VAR(1) process of the form
θ
(0:∞)
t|t = Mθ
(0:∞)
t−1|t−1 + N

vt
t

(A.1)
The price function
pt = λ
Z
E [pt+1 | It(j)] dj

+ λψct − δγλ[θt + t] (A.2)
can then be equivalently represented by a linear function of the contemporaneous
expectation hierarchy, i.e.
pt = aθ
(0:∞)
t|t + bct − dt (A.3)
= λ
Z
E [pt+1 | It(j)] dj

+ λψct − δγλ[θt + t] (A.4)
where
a =δγλe1

I − λM
−1
(A.5)
and
M ≡ M

0∞×1 I

(A.6)
Proof. Iterate (4.9) forward
pt =
λψ
1 − λψ
ct − δγλt − δγλθt (A.7)
−(δγλ)λ
Z
E [θt+1 | It(j)] dj

−(δγλ)λ2
Z
E
Z
E [θt+2 | It+1(j)] dj | It(j)

dj − ...
... − (δγλ)λ∞
Z
E[
Z
E[
Z
E[
Z
E [θt+∞ | It+∞(j)] dj | It+k−1(j) dj]
| It+1(j)]dj | It(j)] dj
i.e. the price is a function of the average expectation in period t of the value of the
supply shock θ in period t+1 and the average expectation in period t of the average
expectation of the value of θ in period t+2 and so on. We can use the operator
M = M

0 I

from Section 3 to write the price function as
pt =
λψ
1 − λψ
ct − δγλt − δγλ
∞ X
s=0
λse1M
s
θ
(0:∞)
t|t (A.8)26 KRISTOFFER P. NIMARK
or equivalently
pt =
λψ
1 − λψ
ct − δγλt − δγλe1

I − λM
−1
θ
(0:∞)
t|t (A.9)
which completes the proof 
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 2
The transition matrix M is lower triangular, all elements are non-negative and
the sum of the elements in each row sum to ρ.
Proof. The transition matrix for the hierarchy θ
(0:∞)
t|t is given by
M =

ρ 01×∞
(K1 − δγλK2)ρ (I − KL)M + K2a2:∞M1:∞

(B.1)
We thus need to show that the lower right hand block (I − KL)M +K2a1:∞M1:∞
is lower triangular. Using that
L =

1 0 0
a1 ··· a∞

(B.2)
and some manipulation yields
(I − KL)M + K2a1:∞M1:∞ = (B.3)


I −



k11 0
. . . 0
k∞1 0





M +



P∞
s=2 k12asms1
P∞
s=2 k12asms2 ···
P∞
s=2 k12asms∞
. . .
. . .
...
. . . P∞
s=2 k∞2asms1
P∞
s=2 k∞2asms2 ···
P∞
s=2 k∞2asms∞


 −



P∞
s=1 k12asms1
P∞
s=1 k12asms2 ···
P∞
s=1 k12asms∞
. . .
. . .
...
. . . P∞
s=1 k∞2asms1
P∞
s=1 k∞2asms2 ···
P∞
s=1 k∞2asms∞



where mij denotes the element in the ith row and the jth column of M. By exo-
geneity of θt, we know that m1,j = 0 : j > 1 which implies that
P∞
s=2 k12asms2 = P∞
s=1 k12asms2 so the terms appearing in the second row and oﬀ the diagonal
in (B.3) cancel out so that m2,j = 0 : 1 < j. We have now established that
all elements in row 1 and 2 of M above the diagonal are zero. Induction yields
mij = 0∀i,j : i < j and i = 1,2,...,∞ , i.e. the matrix M is lower triangular. That
the rows sum to ρ is a direct implication of the Assumption 1. Common knowledge
of rationality implies that if all orders of contemporaneous expectations coincide,
then so must all expectations about future values of the θt which will only be the
case if the rows sum to ρ. An alternative proof is by direct computation of the
elements in (B.1). This shows that the sum of row i of M equals the sum of row
i−1. We know from the exogeneity of θt that Σm1,j = ρ, and the proof then follows
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Appendix C. Computing the price function by Euler equation
iteration
An alternative (and computationally faster) way to ﬁnd the vector a is by exploit-
ing the Euler-type structure of (5.2) and the method of undetermined coeﬃcients.
Substitute (5.3) into the price function (5.2) to get
aθ
(0:∞)
t|t +
λψ
1 − λψ
ct − δγλt (C.1)
= λ
Z
E

aθ
(0:∞)
t+1|t+1 +
λψ
1 − λψ
ct+1 − δγλt+1

| It(j)

dj

+ λψct − δγλ[θt + t]
The fact that
λψ
1 − λψ
ct − δγλt = λE

λψ
1 − λψ
ct+1 − dt+1

+ λψct − δγλt (C.2)
leaves us with
aθ
(0:∞)
t|t = λ
Z
E
h
aθ
(0:∞)
t+1|t+1 | It(j)
i
dj

− δγλθt (C.3)
Common knowledge of rationality implies that
Z
E
h
θ
(0:∞)
t+1|t+1 | It(j)
i
dj = Mθ
(1:∞)
t|t (C.4)
Substituting (C.4) back into (C.3) yields
aθ
(0:∞)
t|t = λaMθ
(1:∞)
t|t − δγλθt (C.5)
Equating coeﬃcients imply that
a(1:∞) = λa(0:∞)M (C.6)
a0 = −δγλ (C.7)
We can compute the elements of a for a given M and δ, by iterating on (C.6)
starting from a0 = −δγλ. This iterative process is faster than using the formula
(A.5) since it does not involve any matrix inversions.
Appendix D. Computing the conditional variance
The conditional variance of (ct+1 +pt+1), δ, is the variance of investors’ forecast
error of the sum ct+1+pt+1 based on their information sets in period t and is given
by
δ = E

1 +
λψ
1 − λψ

ut + aθ
(0:∞)
t|t − aMθ
(1:∞)
t−1|t−1 − δγλt
2
(D.1)
which can be rearranged to
δ =
"
1 + 2
λψ
1 − λψ
+

λψ
1 − λψ
2#
σ2
u (D.2)
+aPa0 + (δγλ)
2 σ2
 − 2E
h
aθ
(0:∞)
t|t − aMθ
(1:∞)
t−1|t−1

δγλt
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The expression on the second line of (D.2) can be computed by putting the hierarchy
of contemporaneous expectations into state space form together with the transitory
supply shock t
"
θ
(0:∞)
t|t
t
#
=

M 0
0 0
"
θ
(0:∞)
t−1|t−1
t−1
#
+

N1 N2
0 1

vt
t

(D.3)

st(j)
pt −
λψ
1−λψct

=

e0
1 0
a −δγλ
"
θ
(0:∞)
t|t
t
#
+

1
0

ηt(j) (D.4)
Deﬁne
Xt ≡
"
θ
(0:∞)
t|t
t
#
(D.5)
b P ≡ E
 
Xt − Xt|t−1
 
Xt − Xt|t−1
0
(D.6)
b a ≡

a −δγλ

(D.7)
then
b ab Pb a0 = aPa0 + (δγλ)
2 σ2
 − 2E
h
aθ
(0:∞)
t|t − aMθ
(1:∞)
t−1|t−1

δγλt
i
(D.8)
where b P is the one period ahead forecast error covariance matrix associated with
the state space system (D.3)-(D.4). The conditional variance of the sum of the
coupon payment and the price is then given by
δ = b ab Pb a0 +
"
1 + 2
λψ
1 − λψ
+

λψ
1 − λψ
2#
σ2
u. (D.9)